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Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn out
to Be a Nightmare?
By Sidney Verba
Studies of citizen participation often assume that widespread and equal participation is beneficial for democracy. This article
examines the arguments for and against equal citizen participation: although it may lead to lower-quality participation—less
informed, less supportive of democracy—it also leads to a distortion of the needs and preferences of citizens as they are 
communicated into the political process.
Observing some beggars in the street as we walked along, I said to him I supposed that there was no coun-
try in the world in which the misery of want in the lowest classes of the people was prevented. Johnson
[replied]: “I believe, sir, there is not, but it is better that some should be unhappy than that none should
be happy, which would be the case in a general state of equality.” — James Boswell, Life of Johnson
We may naturally believe that it is not the prosperity of the few, but the greater well-being of all that is
most pleasing in the sight of the Creator. . . . A state of equality is perhaps less elevated, but it is more
just, and its justice constitutes its greatness and its beauty.
— Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America
Je participe
Tu participes
Il participe
Nous participons
Vous participez
Ils profitent — From a Wall in Paris, 1972
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O
f the various ways in which U.S. citizens can be unequal,
political  inequality  is  one  of  the  most  significant  and
troubling. Political equality refers to the extent to which
citizens have an equal voice in governmental decisions. One of the
bedrock principles in a democracy is the equal consideration of
the preferences and interests of all citizens. This is expressed in
such concepts as one person/one vote, equality before the law, and
equal rights of free speech. It is fostered by equal political activity
among citizens—not only in voting turnout across significant cat-
egories  of  citizens,  but  also  in  other  forms  of  participation,
3
including work in a political campaign, campaign contributions,
various sorts of civic activity within one’s local community, direct
contact with officials, and protest. Equal activity is crucial for
equal consideration since political activity is the means by which
citizens make their needs and preferences known to governing
elites and induce them to be responsive. Citizen participation is,
thus, at the heart of political equality. Through their activity, cit-
Sidney Verba is Carl H. Pforzheimer University Professor at
Harvard University and director of the Harvard University Library
(sverba@harvard.edu). He gratefully acknowledges input from sev-
eral individuals.
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izens in a democracy seek to control who will hold public office
and to influence what the government does.
Equality in all domains of social and political life is complex.
It can be about many different valued goods (income, educa-
tion, health); it can be across individuals or groups; it can be
calculated with different measures and on the basis of different
criteria.  There  are,  as  the  title  of  the  book  Equalities (by
Douglas Rae and his colleagues)
4 makes clear, many versions of
it. And in most of its forms, it is something of mixed worth. For
most valued things—income or education or health or respect
or political influence—gross inequalities are something we dis-
like. But complete equality is rarely unambiguously desirable. 
It is usually impossible to attain, or the process of attaining it
would be too costly, or its consequences would be negative. It
may, therefore, be useful to consider why political equality—
defined  roughly  as  equal  influence  over  government  policy
across  citizens—might  be  desirable  within  the  framework  of
democratic governance, but also why the cost of such equality
might be too great.
This article responds to the new and important mission of
Perspectives on Politics to reach beyond the standard research
article. I present very little new research here; rather, I offer an
overview  of  some  significant  issues  in  the  study  of  citizen 
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activity and its relation to polit-
ical  equality.  The  topic  is
broad, and much has been writ-
ten  on  it. To  give  this  article
some  boundaries  as  well  as
some  coherence,  I  will  not
attempt a summary or overview
of the empirical research on the
subject—except  in  the  most
cursory way, to set the stage for
what I want to discuss.
5 I will
instead focus on broader issues
that frame the questions associ-
ated  with  citizen  activity,  in
particular  some  normative
questions  on  participatory
equality:  for  example,  how
much of what kind of partici-
pation from whom is desirable?
The  normative  discussion  will
be informed by the data on cit-
izen activity, bridging a divide
that sometimes exists in the dis-
course  on  political  equality
between  empirical  researchers
and political philosophers. The
former sometimes make easy assumptions about the desirabili-
ty of equality of political voice; the latter often elaborate the
optimal  level  of  participation  or  participatory  equality  with
only cursory consideration of the relevant empirical data.
6 In
most of our work, my collaborators and I have assumed the
desirability of political equality—certainly the desirability of
more political equality than we currently have in the United
States. The purpose of this article is to question that precon-
ception.
How important is it that political activity come equally from
all citizens or—to make this point more precise and realistic—
that it come with equal probability from each relevant type of
citizen? Note that I am dealing with the equality and not the
level of political activity. A few words on the distinction between
the two may be useful. Participation fosters democracy in vari-
ous ways. Some of its beneficial effects on democracy depend
more heavily on the amount, or level, of political participation,
while other beneficial effects depend on the equality of partici-
pation. Conveying a sense of membership or building commu-
nity or creating legitimacy—all associated with citizen engage-
ment—depends on the level of participation (that is, on how
many  participate).  Declining  political  activity  may  signal  a
decline  in  citizen  commitment  and  support  for  the  polity;
democracy seems weaker if few take part. Conversely, too high a
participation rate may strain a democratic system, overloading it
with demands that cannot be met. Political equality, however, is
more closely related to another aspect of democratic function-
ing: equal protection of the interests of all citizens. This depends
less on how many participate than on the representativeness of
those who participate.
7
What Are We Equalizing? 
Before turning to the arguments in favor of and opposed to polit-
ical equality, we need to take a closer look at what political equal-
ity means. What exactly would we equalize if we achieved politi-
cal equality?
What kind of activity?
Much of the literature on political participation focuses on vot-
ing. There are several reasons for this: elections are the basic
democratic institution, so voting is the basic citizen right; the
aggregate of the vote determines who runs the government; vot-
ing  is  the  most  frequent  political  act;  and,  last,  vast  data
resources—both survey data and official election data—exist for
the analysis of voting. But there are many other ways that citi-
zens can take part in politics (direct contact, protest, and cam-
paign activity or contributions, to name a few). These differ in
significant ways, particularly in terms of the amount of infor-
mation they convey about the needs and preferences of citizens
and how much pressure they put on elites to respond. A full
understanding of political inequality requires a consideration of
these various means. I will not explore these differences here,
since they are amply discussed elsewhere.
8 Let me turn, rather,
to some more general aspects of equality of political participa-
tion, each of which is relevant to a full understanding of what it
would mean to make political voice equal. Equality of political
voice  may  refer  to  the  equal  right  to  participate,  the  equal
capacity and opportunity to participate, equality in the amount
and  nature  of  political  activity  coming  from  individuals  or 
segments of society, equality in the reception of one’s political
voice (government officials hear what is said and give it equal
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sconsideration),  and  equality  in  response  (all  citizens  receive
equal treatment in terms of policies and the implementation of 
policies).
The equal right to participate
This  main  democratic  requirement  includes,  among  other
rights, universal adult suffrage; freedom of speech, the press,
and other modes of political expression; and the right to organ-
ize political parties. These basic entitlements, held (more or
less) universally, are considered necessary features of any demo-
cratic  regime  in  almost  all  contemporary  conceptions  of
democracy. As far as the United States is concerned, these are
pretty much in place as a result of the 19th Amendment and
the civil and voting rights acts of the 1960s. There are no legal
barriers to citizen participation because of gender or race/eth-
nicity, and we have numerous legal protections against discrim-
ination along those lines.
9 A muted debate about age restric-
tions  on  participation  was  largely  ended  with  the  26th
Amendment.
There continue to be, however, disagreements over the univer-
sality of the right to participate. For instance, in many states, con-
victed felons do not have the right to vote; in some cases, that ban
remains in effect for life. Relatively few, if any, restrictions apply
to the speech rights of people in the United States, but there are
restrictions on monetary contributions from noncitizens.
10 And
the issue of voting rights for long-term noncitizen residents is
controversial.
Two aspects of these issues deserve special note. One is the
distinction  between  the  explicit,  intended  consequences  of
equality-limiting  rules  and  the  unintended  equality-limiting
consequences  of  such  rules.
Restricting the voting rights of
felons or former felons (under
the  explicit  justification  that
felons have stepped outside the
moral  realm  of  citizenry)  has
the unintended consequence of
restricting the voting rights of
African  American  males.
11 In
former times, restrictions based
on literacy (on the explicit justi-
fication that people need to be
literate to be informed voters)
had  the  effect  of  limiting  the
political activity of immigrants
and  blacks—a  limitation  that
was surely intentional regarding
African  Americans  in  the
South.  Indeed,  it  is  clear  that
“unintended” consequences are
not always unintended.
12
Another  important  factor  is
the locus of control over partici-
patory  rights.  The  fact  that
many aspects of voting rights—
the  rights  of  felons,  for
instance—are under state control raises obvious issues of equality
of rights.
So although most normative theories of participation are in
agreement  that  equality  of  rights  is  a  necessary  condition  for
democracy, some controversies remain, both in fact and in terms
of the ideal state. I will not focus on these controversies, but will
turn to the next step in the path to effective citizen voice: the
capacity to be politically active. 
Equal capacity and opportunity to participate
As the old saying goes, freedom of the press is a wonderful right
if you own a press. Rights require resources. One may need cer-
tain civic skills or competencies to participate effectively: infor-
mation about elections so as to vote one’s preferences, the capac-
ity to speak publicly so as to communicate one’s preferences,
knowledge of political decision-making structures so as to inter-
vene effectively in the decisional processes. One will need money
to take part in politics as a financial contributor. And effective
participation  means  equal  opportunities  to  participate:  equal
access to information, to representatives, to government agencies,
to  organizations.  Some  activities  are  more  dependent  on
resources than others. Activity in one’s community or contacting
an official requires more skill than does voting. Political contri-
butions are the most resource dependent, requiring as they do
the  financial  wherewithal.  Voting  is  the  political  act  least
dependent on skills and for which the opportunity to act is most
clearly presented to the citizen at election time.
13
Resources  and  opportunity  make  political  equality  deeply
dependent upon equality in other domains, such as education,
income,  connectedness,  and  health  and  well-being.  In  turn, 
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political equality fosters equality in other domains by increasing
the likelihood of policies that favor socioeconomic equality. This
makes clear why some thinkers consider the capacity to exercise
equal political voice to be of central concern in a democracy.
Amartya Sen, in his discussion of what “goods” are important to
equalize, refers to certain basic capabilities needed to achieve a
full life.
14 Political voice is one of these, since it allows the indi-
vidual to acquire many other valued goods, such as income, edu-
cation, health, and respect. But these, in turn, are general capa-
bilities  that  enable  the  acquisition  of  political  voice.  In  other
words, political voice may be in the center of a virtuous circle of
capabilities for those advantaged in a society, but a vicious circle
of incapabilities for the disadvantaged.
Equal voice 
If it is to entail equal consideration, however, equal participation
may need to go beyond equal rights and equal capacity to include
equal use of rights and capacity. One may have the right, the
resources,  and  the  opportunity  to  be  active,  but  for  various 
reasons—from ignorance to indifference—one may not choose to 
participate. Thus, equal rights and equal capacity do not neces-
sarily mean equal voice.
Is anyone listening? The right to participate, the capacity to par-
ticipate, and actual participation represent crucial steps toward
equal consideration. But equal consideration may involve addi-
tional steps having to do with the response of governing officials
to the expressed political voice. What if you send a message and
no one pays attention? Two citizens may be equal in their voice
(suppose that both vote, both write frequent and compelling let-
ters to government officials, and both attend town meetings reg-
ularly), but one may for various reasons receive more attention
than the other. Voting turnout may be equal across individuals or
groups, but if some votes are not counted or if election districts
are wildly different in size, electoral participation is not equal. If
some letters are read and others left unopened, if some campaign
workers or contributors have less of the ear of the candidate than
do others, that is not equal voice.
Is anyone doing anything? The ultimate purpose—or, at least, one
of the main purposes—of political activity is to get the government
to do something in one’s interest, whether that be a policy or a
political favor. Political equality in its fullest sense would be equal
policy output. Since policies do not always accomplish what they
are intended to do, full equality of treatment would be a set of poli-
cies that treated all citizens equally. In some sense, these last two
aspects  of  political  equality—being  heard  and  getting  results—
represent its “true” instrumental meaning and are the ultimate pay-
off of equal participation and equal voice. They are difficult to
observe and measure. The literature on the receipt of messages and
the response to them is not as well developed as that on the mes-
sages sent. Making the connection is complicated since policies
derive from many forces, not just citizen input. And sorting out
why preferences and elite decisions overlap is not easy.
15
In sum, political equality can mean many things, from the
equal right to participate to equal treatment of all by the govern-
ment.  Equal  political  rights  are  fairly  well  established  in  the
United States, though they are sometimes not enforced equally.
But equal treatment for all is not possible, since individuals and
groups have different needs and preferences, and policies favor-
ing some are less favorable to others. Thus, this article concen-
trates on those aspects of political equality between the basic
right to participate and the ultimate but unattainable result of
equal treatment; that is, on equality across individuals and groups
in the capacity to express political needs and preferences and in
the actual use of that capacity. Democracies are sounder when the
reason why some lose does not rest on the fact that they are invis-
ible to those who make decisions. Equal treatment may be unat-
tainable, but equal consideration is a goal worth striving for. And
for the latter to exist, equal capacity to express political voice and
equal expression of that voice are key.
Participatory Equality: How Much Is There?
Most of the empirical work on which I draw asserts that the ideal
of  political  equality—in  the  sense  of  equal  voice—is  never
achieved. The literature attempts to explain why that is the case.
It may be useful to summarize some of the main conclusions of
the empirical literature to set the stage for a debate on political
equality as an ideal.
16
(1) Though rights are equal, the actual use of such rights is
stratified. Some people are more active than others. More impor-
tant, there are persistent differences in the level of activity across
politically relevant groups—that is, groups with distinctive needs
and political preferences. Thus, if participation is a means by
which citizen needs and preferences are communicated to gov-
erning elites—and if it is a significant means—the voices of indi-
viduals vary in their intensity and, more important in terms of
policy outcomes, so do the voices of groups.
(2) In general, citizens who are advantaged when it comes to
education, income, social standing, race/ethnicity, or gender are
more politically active than those who are not.
(3) Unequal use of participatory rights rests on unequal capaci-
ty and opportunity. More active citizens are better endowed with
participatory resources (such as time, money, and civic skills); they
are  more  likely  to  be  motivated  (that  is,  to  be  interested 
in politics, to feel efficacious), to discern the connection between
their own needs/preferences and public policy, and to be in social
positions  where  they  may  be  recruited  to  engage  in  politics.
Resources,  motivation,  and  recruitment  opportunities  often
accompany positions of advantage in other spheres—a fact that
accounts for the political advantage held by the socioeconomically
advantaged.
(4) The  relationship  between  motivation  and  resources  is 
particularly  relevant  to  the  normative  issues  associated  with
political  equality.  In  evaluating  the  extent  to  which  there  is
inequality  of  voice,  it  is  important  to  differentiate  between
those  citizens  who—to  use  a  distinction  that  Kay  Lehman
Schlozman, Henry Brady, and I have used elsewhere—cannot
participate because they lack the resources to do so and those
who choose not to participate because they lack the interest or
inclination.
17 The  former  situation  is  a  greater  violation  of
democratic values than the latter. If an individual stays home
666 December 2003 Vol. 1/No. 4from a town meeting because he or she lacks the funds to hire a
baby-sitter or does not feel that he or she has the capacity to
speak out effectively, we may consider this a violation of the
norm of equal voice. If, however, an individual stays home to
watch a favorite TV show or for lack of interest in local politi-
cal issues, we do not feel that he or she has been deprived of a
civic right or opportunity.
18
(5) The relationship of political activity and the socioeconomic
resources that foster it is a reciprocal one. If government policy
and  implementation  of  that  policy  are  responsive  to  active 
citizens—and the evidence for this is convincing, though not as
systematic and strong as that for individual citizen behavior—the
result may be that less-advantaged citizens are less active because
of the deficit of participation-enhancing factors among people in
a low socioeconomic position. In turn, policy (say, in education or
taxes or welfare programs) will be more responsive to the advan-
taged and active citizens, thereby increasing their advantage while
providing relatively little for the disadvantaged. And so political
inequality is reinforced.
(6) The reciprocal reinforcement of socioeconomic and politi-
cal inequality depends heavily on the role of resources that foster
participation  and  that  derive  from  socioeconomic  position.
However, under certain circumstances, individuals and groups
can become mobilized or otherwise motivated to political activi-
ty in connection with particular issues. When this phenomenon
is accompanied by recruitment to activity of those who would
otherwise be inactive because they lack the requisite resources, the
socioeconomic/political circle can be broken. But recruitment to
activity more often reinforces the socioeconomic stratification of
political  participation,  as  recruiters  seek  those  who  have  the
resource capacity to be effective activists.
19
Political Equality: Its Value and 
Its Dangers
The above account simplifies a complex body of literature, but
the general story is accurate. If equal consideration of the needs
and preferences of all citizens is a central principle of democracy,
then participatory inequality represents a violation of democratic
principles. Is this, however, a serious challenge to the extent to
which the United States may be said to function as an effective
democracy?  The  participation  literature  usually  deplores  such
inequality. Much of the empirical scholarship assumes that even
if an ideal of fully equal participation is very likely unattainable,
greater equality would be desirable. But would it be? Suppose that
all citizens spoke with equal voice or that each politically relevant
category of citizens (that is, all groupings of citizens that have dif-
ferent politically relevant needs or preferences) spoke with equal
probability. What would democracy look like? Better in some
ways, not so good in others.
Why might we want political equality?
The participation literature offers many reasons, including the
following:
Political equality is intrinsically valued. Political equality is a val-
ued good per se. The ability to express one’s political views con-
stitutes membership in the polity. It confers a sense of selfhood,
of agency, of belonging. Put another way, there are some who
denigrate the importance of voting, since voting rights and vot-
ing participation do not bring with them the solution to all or
even most problems (consider the case of blacks in the American
South, for example, or in South Africa). But those who denigrate
the importance of the vote are almost always people who already
have the right to vote. Democracy is valued not because demo-
cratic rule produces the most efficient or the most coherent poli-
cies (which it often does not do) or even the most just policies
(which it may or may not do), but because it confers an impor-
tant and valued status on its members: that of citizens who have
the equal right and ability to control their own lives through
influence over collective decisions. This status is not only a means
to some other end; it is valuable in itself.
Political equality builds community.Societies are bound together by
cooperative activity toward shared goals. This is how that precious
commodity of social capital is formed. Since this involves horizon-
tal connections, it implies the engagement of equals.
Political participation creates legitimacy. Democracy depends on
citizens’ voluntary acquiescence to the government (obedience to
laws without constant police control, acceptance of election out-
comes by the losing side, et cetera). The laws or electoral out-
comes that one might not favor deserve respect because they were
selected, through proper procedures, by the people (or at least the
larger number of the people), with no individual or group given
more voice in that decision than any other.
Political  participation  is  educative. People  learn  about  politics,
democracy, and their own needs and preferences through partici-
pation for all. Equality is valuable in political activity just as it is
in education.
Political equality enables equal protection of interests. Democracy
implies equal consideration of the needs and preferences of all cit-
izens. This instrumental aspect of political equality—the ability
to inform the government of one’s needs and preferences and to
pressure the government to pay attention—is the key to that
equal consideration. Those who express political voice, by voting
or by speaking up or in other ways, are more likely to have gov-
ernment policies that pay attention to their needs and prefer-
ences. In this sense, political voice represents a general capacity to
achieve many goals. Equality in political voice is, thus, a basic
form of equality.
Why might we not want political equality?
In the empirical work on political participation, equal participa-
tion is assumed to be a good thing. But there is a dark side to
equal participation. There can be too much of a good thing.
Alongside  the  literature  that  implicitly  or  explicitly  promotes
political equality is an extensive literature warning of the dangers
of too much and too equal political activity. 
Democratic  government is  a  term  with  internal  tension.
Democratic refers to rule by the people, with control flowing
upward from citizens to decision makers. Government refers to
authoritative decisions that control society and people’s lives.
The difficulty of putting the two terms together is that, on the
democratic side, the people are many and varied, which makes
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the coordination of their needs and preferences difficult; and
their attention to and knowledge of policy issues is limited,
which ill equips them to judge among alternative policies. At
the  same  time,  government  involves  making  complex  policy
decisions that balance the needs and preferences of many actors.
The usual response to this tension is representative government,
where the masses elect representatives who can—to use James
Madison’s language—“refine and enlarge” the preferences of the
public. Democratic government, it is generally accepted, is rep-
resentative government.
20 The political equality I am discussing
does not question the fact that elected representatives inevitably
have greater political voice than do ordinary citizens, or that the
representatives are (or at least should be) better informed and
more capable of governing. But what constitutes the optimum
political voice for the ordinary citizen, and what are the costs
and benefits of having that voice emanate equally from all citi-
zens? Are citizens equally capable of responsible democratic par-
ticipation—that is, participation that leads to effective demo-
cratic policy? Since education is the social characteristic that
best  predicts  political  activity  and  distinguishes  “responsible
democrats” from others, I will look at these questions from that
perspective.
The foundation of political equality among citizens is the fun-
damental equality of human beings. For some earlier thinkers,
this equality rests on the belief that all people are equal before
God.  A  more  secular  pair  of  explanations,  expressed  by  such
democratic thinkers as Robert Dahl and John Rawls,
21 is that
people are reasoning beings capable of understanding the world
and that they are moral beings capable of distinguishing good
from bad. What does this mean for the ordinary citizen, and why
is it the principle on which equal citizen voice is grounded? For
one thing, it means that citizens should be good—or at least ade-
quate—moral reasoners. Their preferences and values, whatever
their substance, should have some coherence and be somewhat
stable. It also may imply that their preferences should coincide
with their interests. This point—whether individuals can judge
their own best interests—is very complex, of course. Dahl essen-
tially says that individuals may not know their best interests, but
that  it  remains  hard  to  find  someone  else  who  knows  better.
Furthermore, if preferences and values change from moment to
moment or if they are incoherent and self-contradictory, it is hard
to know how they can be given meaningful expression.
22 Some
would also argue that good citizens ought to be willing to tran-
scend their own values and preferences. One component of this
willingness is the ability to look beyond their own narrow self-
interest to consider the common good. Selfishness, according to
this argument, is detrimental to democracy; citizens ought to be
committed to some common good; and the process of taking part
in politics should increase the likelihood that they will view pol-
itics from this broader perspective. Another component of the
morally competent citizen is a willingness to accept principles of
fair democratic procedure that allow for a multiplicity of view-
points  or  doctrines  to  be  expressed.  Rawls  refers  to  this  as  a 
free-standing overlapping consensus on a democratic process that
involves tolerating alternative doctrines.
23This, as he notes and as
many democratic theorists have noted before, is needed to main-
tain a stable democracy given the inevitable plurality of compet-
ing doctrines subscribed to by citizens in a democracy.
In  addition,  citizens  should  be  good  (or  at  least  adequate)
social scientists. They should have enough information to know
how to pursue their goals through politics. They should be capa-
ble of making causal inferences about how their activity might
lead to desired outcomes (for instance, of figuring out whom to
vote for or how one policy rather than another will affect their
welfare). If they cannot reason about the political world, what do
their expressed preferences mean? Thus, democratic voice would
seem to rest on some capacity of citizens to be moral reasoners
and social scientific reasoners. But what if citizens are not up to
the task? What if they don’t know what they want? What if they
know what they want, but not how to get it? What if they care
nothing for the common good? What if they can’t be relied upon
to go beyond their own preferred value system to tolerate others?
Democratic  voice  becomes  meaningless  or  undesirable. These
considerations have led many philosophers of democratic govern-
ment—from  the  founders  of  America  to  thinkers  like  Walter
Lippmann or Joseph Schumpeter,
24 to current observers of all
political stripes who are leery of the public and its opinions—to
express skepticism about the public, about too much democracy,
about populist democracy.
The concern touches directly on political equality. What if cit-
izens are unequally equipped for moral reasoning or social science
analysis? Some are competent, others not. Consider this from the
perspective of education. When there is unequal political activity,
it is the better educated who tend to be more active. In our
research on participation, my colleagues and I tried to discover
why education is so potent a predictor of political activity. Is it
because it makes people more informed? Makes them feel more
efficacious? Makes it easier for them to see connections between
their  values/preferences  and  governmental  action?  Is  it  that  it
inculcates the norm that one ought to be a participant? Does it
increase the store of resources that people have—skills that make
one an effective participant, or income that is useful for con-
tributing to political campaigns or causes? Does it put individu-
als into networks, so that they are surrounded by others who are
active and who can help them act effectively? The answer is “all
of the above.” Education fosters activity through its effect on
information, skills, values, resources, networks, and more. No
wonder it is so potent. 
Some simple data make this point clear. Compare individuals
who have no college education with college graduates. The latter
are more active in any of the activities we measure, and by a long
shot. They are, for instance, twice as likely to have contacted a
government official (a good way to express political voice) than
are people with only a high school education. They are one-third
more likely to vote, three times as likely to work in a campaign,
and twice as likely to be community activists; they give about 12
times as much money to political campaigns and causes. (See
Figure  1.)  High  school  graduates  contribute  on  average  $15;
those with some college contribute $53; and college graduates
rise to $186 worth of campaign contributions.
25
Furthermore, numerous social science analyses show that edu-
cation is the best predictor of the quality of citizen engagement.
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moral reasoners. They are not only more active; they are better cit-
izens. (See Figure 2 for examples.) They are more informed, have
more consistent political values, and can make better connections
between means and ends. In general, they are more supportive of
the rules of democracy, more tolerant of unpopular voices, more
committed to communal rather than individualistic goals. They
get twice as many information items
right  as  uneducated  citizens:  the
mean  information  score  for  those
with no college is 3.7, compared with
4.8  among  those  with  some  college
and  5.7  among  college  graduates.
When the educated contact govern-
ment officials, they are four times as
likely to raise an issue that has broad
relevance, rather than some issue lim-
ited  to  themselves  and  their  family;
they have, thus, more civic concern.
They are substantially likely to sup-
port the right of someone who oppos-
es religion to speak in the community.
And on and on.
26 The conclusion is
clear. It is good for democracy that the
educated  are  more  active:  they  are
higher quality citizens.
The  distinction  between  more-
educated  and  less-educated  citizens
holds—though  not  as  strongly—for
other  distinctions  that  divide  the
more advantaged from the less advan-
taged, whether based on income or kind of job or race/ethnicity
or gender. The cause of all these differences may rest in educa-
tional disparity; nevertheless, however one defines disadvantaged,
if one equalizes participation between the advantaged and the dis-
advantaged, the quality of that participation will go down.
The limitations of citizens as moral reasoners (unsure of what
they want and/or perhaps wanting things antithetical to democ-
racy), coupled with their weaknesses
as  social  analysts  (ill-informed  and
unable to see the causal connections
that would allow them to act in ways
that would get them what they want),
call  into  question  the  role  of  citi-
zen  participation  in  a  democracy.
Schumpeter provides the classic case
for  limited  participation.
27 In  the
Schumpeterian  analysis,  electoral
participation is the key role for citi-
zens, who vote on leaders and then
are finished. Elites are supposed to be
left to rule. That does not end citizen
control, because leaders must worry
about the next election. The essential
participatory role is the citizen as ret-
rospective voter. For Schumpeter, the
right to vote is crucial, but that’s it.
This position is attractive. Elections
are  the  democratic  institution  on
which  everything  else  rests.  Election
results are, with rare exceptions, dis-
positive when it comes to who is in
charge.  And  elections  are  the  most
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Figure 1
Political Activity by Education
Source: Citizen Participation Study. For further information on the study, see Verba et al. 1995.
Figure 2
Citizen Quality by Education
*Very interested in local or national politics
Source: Citizen Participation Study. For further information on the study, see Verba et al. 1995.Articles Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn out to Be a Nightmare?
egalitarian of activities. More citizens vote than take part in any
other way, and voting is more equally distributed across the citi-
zenry than is any other act. Citizen control via retrospective voting
does not strain citizen competence and gives ruling elites the space
to make the carefully considered expert decisions needed to run a
complex society.
This restrictive notion of democracy—with little room or need
for citizen activity—would be an adequate approach to a govern-
ment that gave equal consideration to all citizens if (1) activists did
not differ in their preferences from inactive citizens and (2) voting
in elections was the dominant, perhaps sole, means of citizen activ-
ity. Let us consider both of these conditions. 
If activists do not differ from inactive citizens, it matters little
that some citizens are active and some inactive. The former can
speak for the latter. But if they do differ, is it in politically rele-
vant ways? How do their preferences compare in regard to pend-
ing political issues? Aside from views on pending issues, do the
inactives differ from the actives on the issues they would bring
forward if they were more active? Are there—to resurrect a word
from  earlier  political  science—“nonissues”  hidden  in  inactive
populations? And even if the inactives differ neither in prefer-
ences nor in agendas, are their politically relevant needs different
from those of the actives? Policy makers do not merely listen to
who speaks; they observe what citizens are active and see what
they need. Visibility applies to activity both in terms of prefer-
ences that people have and needs that they may have but do not
express. 
In their study of voting turnout, Raymond Wolfinger and
Steven Rosenstone make an important point that has become
part of political science common wisdom: although voters dif-
fer  from  nonvoters  in  their  demographic  composition  (their
level of education, their income, et cetera), they differ little in
their  policy  preferences  as  measured  by  their  responses  to  a
series of survey questions about attitudes on government wel-
fare and other policies.
28 Schlozman, Brady, and I replicated the
Wolfinger and Rosenstone analysis and confirmed that there
was little attitudinal difference between voters and nonvoters.
29
Others have found differences, but usually not large ones.
30 In
addition, various analysts have shown that the outcome of an
election would rarely be changed if one eliminated turnout dif-
ferentials  among  groups—if,  for  instance,  everyone  voted.
31
This is a corrective to a common view that an increase in vot-
ing turnout is coterminous with an increase among the voting
population in the proportion of those who are less well off.
Those who believe that equalizing turnout among those who
currently are less likely to vote would produce a major change
in the electoral mandate
32 might well be disappointed by the
results of massive vote mobilization.
However, since the existence of politically relevant differences
between the active and inactive citizens is at the heart of the 
significance of participatory inequality, it is useful to look at this
more  closely  using  the  range  of  information  available  in  the
American Citizen Participation Study.
33 The similarity in many
policy positions of voters and nonvoters is an important point,
but its magnitude can be overstated. Difference is measured in a
comparison  of  responses  by  voters  and  nonvoters  to  standard
National Election Studies questions on a set of political issues. If
one expands the scope of inquiry, one gets different results. First,
we must take a broader view of politically relevant attributes,
encompassing  not  only  demographics  and  policy  positions  as
expressed in response to survey questions but also policy-relevant
circumstances and the actual content of participation. We must
also take a broader view of political activity, moving beyond elec-
toral turnout to include various kinds of activity that can convey
more precise messages to policy makers as well as activities such as
campaign contributions or campaign work, where activists are not
limited in the amount of their activity by the enforced equality of
the single vote.
When we do this, we find that active and inactive citizens are
not the same. Differential voice means that different things are
being said—especially by activities that can easily carry a message.
In our participation study, we consider not only active and inac-
tive citizens’ preferences for social policy, but also their needs and
life circumstances. When we move to the level of needs and ask
whether respondents have faced serious economic deprivation, we
find much wider disparity across activity groups. Further, when we
look at those citizens perhaps most dependent on government
programs—citizens receiving means-tested benefits—we find even
wider variance. And if we expand our scope to consider different
political acts, we find that the divide between the active and inac-
tive citizens increases with the difficulty of the act; more relevant
to our current concern, the disparity grows with the extent to
which the act accurately communicates the needs and preferences
of the actor and the extent to which the act has clout—i.e., is like-
ly to make the target of the act sit up and take notice.
Figure 3 presents data on several characteristics of the population
as a whole and of various activist groups: regular voters, people who
report  contacting  officials,  community  activists,  protesters,  and
contributors to political campaigns and causes. Thus, we get a wide
range of activity types. And for each of the groups of activists,
Figure 3 presents data on their political attitudes (the percent lib-
eral in relation to some standard measures of economic liberal-
ism)
34 and their needs (the percent who have faced financial strain
in  the  past  year
35 and  the  percent  who  received  means-tested 
benefits).
36 We can therefore compare various activities in terms of
how they represent the preferences and the needs of citizens.
In general, the data show that activists are most similar to the
population as a whole in terms of their answers to the questions
about economic policy. They differ somewhat more on measures of
need; in particular, contributors are substantially more likely than
the public in general to report that they faced no financial strain in
the previous year. And when one considers the receipt of means-
tested benefits, it becomes clear that activists, including voters, are
much less likely to come from the ranks of those who may be most
dependent  on  government  policies.  The  contributors  contain
almost no one who has been dependent on governmental welfare. 
Consider those with clear need for government support: those
already receiving welfare benefits. In the three modes of activity
that might be particularly relevant for them—getting in touch
with public officials, attending protests and demonstrations, and
being active in the community—there is severe underrepresenta-
tion. Contacting is, presumably, especially important for citizens
670 December 2003 Vol. 1/No. 4who receive government benefits, since ensuring the flow of ben-
efits  may  entail  dealing  with  officials.  Recipients  of  means-
tested  benefits,  however,  are  substantially  underrepresented
among the contactors; and they are about half as likely as other
citizens to be community activists as their proportion in the pop-
ulation would warrant. Interestingly, even protesters are less like-
ly  to  have  received  means-tested  benefits.  Protest  may  be  the
weapon of the weak for those who
do not have the resources to be oth-
erwise  active,  but  it  is  more  fre-
quently  used  by  those  not  in  the
most need. Protesters are, however,
significantly more likely to be liberal
than the population as a whole. This
suggests that protesters may support
the needs of those on welfare, but
not based on their own experience.
We  can  take  the  analysis  a  step
further  and  look  at  the  political
agenda. Suppose the disadvantaged
were  more  active;  would  they  put
different issues on the agenda than
the advantaged do? Are there needs
and preferences that would be more
prominently  placed  before  govern-
mental officials if the silent were less
silent?  It  is,  of  course,  difficult  to
know what the quiescent would say
if they spoke up; but we can look at
those disadvantaged citizens who do
convey specific messages, and at offi-
cials,  to  obtain  some  estimate  of
what the latter would hear if more of the disadvantaged sent such
explicit communications. In the Citizen Participation Study, we
asked active respondents to tell us if there was some issue or sub-
ject matter that animated their activity. If we look at the infor-
mation-rich acts—those that actually convey a message, such as a
letter to an official, participation in a protest, or a campaign con-
tribution accompanied by a communication as to why the indi-
vidual is making the contribution—
we find, as we would expect, that the
disadvantaged  are  about  a  third  as
likely  as  the  advantaged  to  send
informative messages to officials. (See
Table 1.)  What  is  interesting,  how-
ever, is how different such messages
are when we compare the advantaged
and the disadvantaged. The disadvan-
taged are more than twice as likely as
the  advantaged  to  refer  to  basic
needs—food,  housing,  health  care,
and the like. Advantaged citizens, in
contrast, are three times as likely as
the  disadvantaged  to  discuss  taxes,
government spending, and the bud-
get. They are more likely to put edu-
cation, the environment, social issues,
and international issues on the agen-
da; the disadvantaged are more likely
to  refer  to  issues  of  drugs  and  vio-
lence. The data suggest that the rela-
tive quiescence of the disadvantaged
affects  the  shape  of  the  issues put
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Figure 3
Activity Rates for Various Groups
3.a. Percentage of citizens who are liberal on economic policy
Source: Citizen Participation Study. For further information on the study, see Verba et al. 1995.
Source: Citizen Participation Study. For further information on the study, see Verba et al. 1995.
3.b. Percentage of citizens who received means-tested benefitsArticles Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn out to Be a Nightmare?
before the government by the citizenry. If less-advantaged citizens
were  more  visible,  government  programs  involving  the  basic
needs of the disadvantaged would be more likely to appear on the
political agenda.
Participation tilted toward the advantaged, then, might yield
a higher quality of citizenry, but it also means less equal voice.
This brings us back to the Schumpeterian limited notion of
election-based democracy. Would such a system provide ade-
quate representation for the citizen-
ry? A democratic system rooted in
citizen voting could provide all citi-
zens with equal voice if all citizens
voted (or a representative set of citi-
zens voted), if citizens limited them-
selves to the vote, and if they voted
based on retrospective performance
evaluations  of  the  elected  officials.
Then, that most powerful democrat-
ic  citizen—the  median  voter—
would  rule,  and  the  system  might
not  tilt  in  the  direction  of  the
already  advantaged  citizens,  whose
voice is louder. But not all citizens
vote; thus, the median voter is not
the median citizen. The differences
are not vast, but even our most egal-
itarian mode of activity, voting, tilts
upward. The median voter is more
educated, somewhat better off finan-
cially, and less likely to be needy than
the  median  citizen.  (See  Table  2.)
And citizens do not all have equal
clout as voters. Some gain electoral power by giving money—
and some gain even more by giving a lot of money. In this way,
they buy votes—if not the votes of legislators directly, then the
votes of those induced by campaign spending to select the con-
tributor’s candidate.
As Table 2 shows, the median contributor—especially the medi-
an big contributor—is very different from the median citizen or
the median voter. Insofar as contributions move the electorate and
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Table 1
What Respondents Say:The Subject Matter of Information-Rich* Activities
Advantaged  Disadvantaged 
All respondents respondents** respondents***
Send at least one information-rich message 42% 64% 23%
Among those who do:
% who send at least one such message on basic needs 15% 11% 24%
% who send at least one such message on govt. spending/taxes 15% 18% 6%
% who send at least one such message on education 18% 21% 11%
% who send at least one such message on social issues 12% 14% 6%
% who send at least one such message on violence/drugs 9% 8% 12%
% who send at least one such message on environment 8% 10% 3%
% who send at least one such message on international issues 3% 5% 0%
*Information-rich activities are those through which explicit messages are sent to government officials. Some examples are letters,
protests, campaign contributions accompanied by an explicit message, community activity, or activity on local boards. Specific issue
responses are for those who engaged in an information-rich activity and reported a “codable” (interpretable) subject matter associated
with the act.
**Advantaged: had at least some college, and family income is $50,000 or more.
***Disadvantaged: had no education beyond high school, and family income is $20,000 or less. 
Note: The time frame for these results is one year. Individuals who fall between the categories “advantaged” and “disadvantaged” are
not tracked in this table.
Source: Citizen Participation Study. For further information on the study, see Verba et al. 1995.
3.c. Percentage of citizens who had no financial problems
Source: Citizen Participation Study. For further information on the study, see Verba et al. 1995.the election closer to the concerns and policy preferences com-
mensurate with the contributors’ positions—which is, one would
assume, what they want their contributions to do—a system of
democratic control limited to the vote would not entail the equal-
ity of voice that the “one vote per person” ideal would require.
Of course, the model of electoral control by voters who cast
their ballots and then retire to private concerns until the next
election is not an accurate description of what happens. Between
elections, all the other modes of activity continue—including
those that influence elections, like campaign contributions. And
those activities are even more stratified than the vote.
In sum, inequality in political voice exists and is consequential.
Some speak louder than others and speak in a different voice.
And—to push the figure of speech a bit too far, perhaps—the
more the mode of speaking is amplified (by a large contribution
or an eloquent letter), the more the voice is different. This does
not obviate the reservations that have been expressed about fully
equal activity. It may be that the quality of participation would go
down if equality increased. Perhaps the government would be
faced with demands for an inefficient or short-sighted economic
policy whose long-term impact would be negative even for those
who wanted the policy. Educated and affluent citizens might pre-
fer policies that were better and more clearly reasoned. However,
the goals that they pursued might be ones that benefited them to
the detriment of the economy as a whole or to the less well-off
members (consider the Savings and Loan industry in the 1970s
or the Enrons of the 2000s). Equal participation might also lower
the quality of participation if it meant rule by citizens less com-
mitted  to  such  democratic  values  as  free  speech  or  minority
rights.  There  is  a  tension  between  freedom  and  equality.
However,  such  worries  may  be  exaggerated.  Civil  libertarians
raised concerns after September 11, 2001, about limitations on
free speech or unfair treatment of Muslims; but if there were dan-
gers to freedom in the post-9/11 reactions, they came from secu-
rity concerns among governing elites, not from popular demand.
Furthermore, as Sen has stressed, liberty and equality are closely
and positively related. Exercise of the former often requires a sub-
stantial amount of the latter.
37
What Can Be Done?
Is it possible to change the participatory process so that the play-
ing field is more level and the players are more equally trained and
equipped to compete? The Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM)—
with its stress on resources, motivation, and recruitment—sug-
gests three routes. One would be a change in the underlying social
and economic conditions that create differences among individu-
als and groups in their capacity to be active; a second would be an
increase in the political motivation of less-advantaged citizens;
and a third might involve the recruitment of people whose socio-
economic characteristics would otherwise lead them to be inac-
tive. Direct governmental intervention to level the playing field
would bypass the unequal consequences of the CVM.
Resource disparity
Political inequality in the United States is embedded in the basic
nonpolitical institutions of society. In a variety of works, my col-
leagues  and  I  have  shown  that  differences  in  political  activity
across individuals derive from their positions and experiences in
the family of origin, in schools, in the family as an adult, in the
work force, in religious institutions, and in nonpolitical associa-
tions.
38 It is important to understand how this process, expressed
in our CVM, results in the tilting of the participant population in
favor of some preferences or agendas or needs over others. It is not
so much that particular preferences are held more strongly, or
some agenda items are more compelling, or some needs more
pressing, and that these preferences or agendas or needs drive par-
ticipation. Rather, it is that people with certain social characteris-
tics, such as more education, have more capacity—they have the
relevant resources—to be active. That capacity is issue-neutral.
People with greater resource capacity, whether from the right or
the left, are more active. The tilt in the messages conveyed via
activity comes from the fact that those with more capacity do not
come in equal proportions from the right and the left. This fact
can be seen most simply if we apply the CVM to predict activity
for people with different policy preferences or needs. 
Table 3 reports a simple regression analysis predicting political
activity for several kinds of citizens: those who favor more gov-
ernment intervention to help needy people and those who oppose
such government activity, as well as those who report real eco-
nomic need in the past year and those who report no such need.
39
As Table 3 shows, the same process by which resources accumu-
lated in nonpolitical institutions bring people into political life
works for liberals and conservatives. Similar results are found if we
divide the population along lines of need. Among both the needy
and the not-needy, the CVM works to generate political activity.
The data in Table 3 tell us
a good deal about the dynam-
ics by which some preferences
and  needs  are  given  voice
while others are not. Citizens
participate for many reasons:
because  they  are  asked,
because it is a habit, because
they  believe  a  good  citizen
ought  to  participate.  They
also participate for more pur-
posive reasons: for instance,
to  influence  public  officials
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Table 2
The Median Citizen,Voter, and Contributor in the 1988 Election Year
Median grades of  Median family Percent with little
schooling completed income need*
Citizens 12.5 $31,600 62%
Voters 13.5 $37,500 69%
Campaign contributors 15.5 $42,300 75%
Contributors $250+ 16.0 $59,500 83%
*Report no financial strain in previous year. 
Source: Citizen Participation Study. For further information on the study, see Verba et al. 1995.Articles Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn out to Be a Nightmare?
to act in some way that serves their needs or preferences.
40 These
needs and preferences, as I have shown, receive differential voice,
which derives less from the nature of the needs and preferences
than from the resource endowments of those who hold them. The
process by which individuals acquire resources is issue-neutral, as
is the role of those resources in fostering participation. In sum,
the CVM works the same for liberals and conservatives, for the
more needy and the less needy. But the institutional positions of
individuals with dissimilar needs or preferences are different—in
the amount of education people have, the kinds of jobs they have,
and the resources that they pick up from such positions. Thus,
differential resource endowments lead to differential voice, and
unequal  nonpolitical  social  processes  lead  to  unequal  political
outcomes.
To reduce inequalities in political activity that are fostered by
these socioeconomic processes would, therefore, take nothing less
than reducing socioeconomic inequalities in income, education,
and access to better jobs. It is not in my competence to analyze
whether or how this might happen, but this is likely not a short-
run fix. Indeed, the socioeconomic tilt of activity toward the par-
ticipation of the better-off is self-reinforcing, with political activ-
ity increasing or at least supporting the current socioeconomic
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3.b. Among not-needy citizens* and needy citizens
Not Needy Needy
Variable B SE B T Sig T B SE B T Sig T
Education 0.16 0.02 6.61 0.00 0.20 0.04 5.05 0.00
Family income 0.22 0.04 5.17 0.00 0.30 0.09 3.27 0.00
Civic skills 0.15 0.03 5.95 0.00 0.13 0.04 3.27 0.00
Recruitment 0.23 0.03 7.08 0.00 0.22 0.04 5.21 0.00
Political engagement 0.52 0.03 16.98 0.00 0.49 0.04 12.33 0.00
Controlling for:
Race (black) 0.01 0.02 0.61 0.54 0.03 0.02 1.67 0.10
Ethnicity (Latino) –0.02 0.02 –1.02 0.31 0.01 0.03 0.43 0.67
Gender (female) –0.00 0.01 –0.04 0.97 –0.02 0.01 –1.59 0.11
Age 0.00 0.00 5.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.04 0.00
Age (over 65) –0.01 0.02 –0.68 0.49 –0.05 0.03 –1.66 0.10
(Constant) –0.20 0.03 –7.83 0.00 –0.17 0.04 –4.77 0.00
Activity score for the not needy: 2.30
Activity score for the needy: 1.80
*Did not have trouble paying for basics (food, rent, or medical care) in previous year.
Source: Citizen Participation Study. For further information on the study, see Verba et al. 1995.
Table 3
Predicting Political Activity Using the Civic Voluntarism Model
3.a. Among conservatives and liberals on government economic policies*
Conservatives Liberals
Variable B SE B T Sig T B SE B T Sig T
Education 0.13 0.03 3.96 0.00 0.20 0.04 4.72 0.00
Family income 0.19 0.06 3.38 0.00 0.25 0.08 3.27 0.00
Civic skills 0.15 0.03 5.11 0.00 0.16 0.05 3.39 0.00
Recruitment 0.18 0.04 4.80 0.00 0.21 0.05 3.98 0.00
Political engagement 0.58 0.04 14.79 0.00 0.52 0.05 11.01 0.00
Controlling for:
Race (black) 0.03 0.03 1.01 0.31 0.02 0.02 0.93 0.35
Ethnicity (Latino) 0.03 0.03 0.89 0.37 –0.04 0.03 –1.27 0.20
Gender (female) –0.02 0.01 –1.36 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.73 0.47
Age 0.00 0.00 4.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.34 0.00
Age (over 65) –0.02 0.02 –0.66 0.51 –0.07 0.03 –1.99 0.05
(Constant) –0.20 0.03 –6.35 0.00 –0.27 0.04 –6.46 0.00
Activity score for conservatives: 2.30
Activity score for liberals: 2.10
*Respondents are ranked as liberal or conservative on an opinion scale about government provision of jobs and government spending
on welfare programs.
Source: Citizen Participation Study. For further information on the study, see Verba et al. 1995.inequalities. The CVM process lead-
ing to political activity is politically
neutral in that it favors people with
resources, not people with particular
views. However, though the process
is neutral, the outcome tilts the par-
ticipant population in certain direc-
tions because of resource differences.
The socioeconomic basis of politi-
cal inequality makes clear that this is a
form  of  “durable  inequality.”
41 In
recent work, my colleagues and I have
shown  how  political  inequality  is
transmitted from generation to gener-
ation, in large part through the inher-
itance of socioeconomic position.
42 In
addition, political and socioeconomic
inequality form a mutually reinforcing
circle. Socioeconomic inequality pro-
duces inequality in political voice; this
in turn fosters policies that favor the
already advantaged; and these policies
reinforce socioeconomic inequality.
Political motivation
Disadvantaged citizens are less likely
than the advantaged to be politically
motivated. They have less interest in
politics and are less likely to believe
that they could be efficacious if they
were politically active. This may be
part of a vicious cycle of political disengagement. Those with
fewer resources are less likely to be interested in what they cannot
influence. They may have learned that politics is of little use to
them from observing the role of resources they do not possess—
money in particular.
Can their motivation be increased? The source of much polit-
ical  motivation  appears  to  be  schooling;  equalizing  schooling
would thus be one way of equalizing political participation. It
would also increase the quality of participation. This, of course,
is a long-sought and elusive goal. People can also become active
for specific political reasons: that is, they can be motivated by a
particular  preference  for  a  cause  or  policy  or  candidate.
Individuals can become engaged in an issue that—for whatever
self-interested or social or religious or other reason—leads them
to activity. In such a case, socioeconomic resources do not neces-
sarily dominate the path to politics. 
My colleagues and I have focused on the abortion issue as an
example of political activity motivated by a particular cause. Less-
advantaged  individuals—mostly  religious  pro-life  citizens—
became more active than one might otherwise have predicted. Such
issue-based mobilization of people who are not particularly well
endowed with resources and who might, therefore, otherwise be
inactive illustrates a way in which the socioeconomic tilt of partic-
ipation might be diminished. It also demonstrates that such mobi-
lization  may  not  exist  around  issues  that  would  result 
in greater socioeconomic equality. Furthermore, of course, issue
mobilization  may  also  be  directed  at  the  advantaged,  thereby
increasing the socioeconomic tilt of political activity.
Political recruitment
Many times in American history, disadvantaged people have been
mobilized  around  group  membership  on  a  particular  issue.
However, the United States is not laden with those institutions—
political  parties  or  trade  unions—that  mobilize  the  disadvan-
taged.
43 In many countries, the parties of the left mobilize ordinary
citizens, particularly disadvantaged citizens who might otherwise be
inactive. The Democratic Party in the United States may have done
this more effectively in the past, but the mobilization capacity of
political parties in general has diminished in recent decades
44—and
the mobilization of the disadvantaged does not seem to be high on
the Democratic Party’s agenda. Figure 4 contains some quite rele-
vant data on recruitment by both major political parties. As one can
see,  the  two  parties  do  differ  in  terms  of  their  supporters.
Republican identifiers are more affluent than the average citizen,
and Democratic identifiers are less affluent; and the difference is
fairly substantial. Republican and Democratic voters differ in a sim-
ilar way, though in each party—as the data in Table 2 lead us to
expect—voters are somewhat more affluent than the average citi-
zen. However, when we look at the family income of those recruit-
ed to political activity through a party contact, two things become
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Figure 4
Party Mobilization for Political Activity: Who Is Asked?
Source: Citizen Participation Study. For further information on the study, see Verba et al. 1995.Articles Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn out to Be a Nightmare?
apparent.  Both  parties  recruit  campaign  workers  and  campaign
contributors from the more affluent of their supporters; in particu-
lar,  those  recruited  to  contribute  money  are  substantially  more
affluent than the average citizen. And despite the income difference
between  Republican  and  Democratic  supporters,  or  between
Republican and Democratic voters, the difference between the two
parties in whom they recruit for contributions is quite small. Both
parties go where the money is.
45 In general, as my collaborators and
I have recently shown, mobilization to politics is more likely to
bring in people who would otherwise be active, not those who
would be otherwise inactive. Recruitment, then, may lead to some
participation from disadvantaged citizens who would not otherwise
be active, but overall it increases the stratification of activity.
46
Direct government intervention
Whatever the underlying causes of political inequality, direct
government  intervention  mandating  participatory  equality
would  be  the  most  direct  route  to  a  level  playing  field.
However, a full-scale program to give everyone an actual equal
voice  would  be  very  difficult  to  implement,  would  involve
severe  governmental  intervention,  and  would  require  limita-
tions on freedom. It could be achieved by putting a floor and a
ceiling on activity. A floor would require all to be active at some
defined level—making citizens vote, attend political meetings,
or contribute financially to causes or campaigns. Voting is com-
pulsory in some countries, usually with minor penalties for fail-
ure to vote. It is an innocuous requirement, perhaps, but it
would go against the grain in America and not add much to
political equality.
47 Compulsory attendance and contributions
smack much more of authoritarian techniques than of demo-
cratic ones. A ceiling on political activity exists in relation to
the vote (one person/one vote). But ceilings on money have run
up against court interpretations of the First Amendment, as
would any limitation on writing letters, protesting, or attend-
ing meetings.
This does not mean that there is little room for direct govern-
mental action. Campaign finance reform remains an elusive goal,
but it may be possible to reduce the unequal effects of the domi-
nance of money in electoral politics without butting up against
constitutional objections. The increased role of money has been a
major cause of growing political inequality. In addition, careful
scrutiny of the voting and registration processes may decrease
some  inequalities  in  access  to  the  polls  revealed  in  the  2000 
presidential election. And reconsideration of the laws governing
the voting rights of ex-felons might reduce some—possibly unin-
tended—racial biases in the election process.
Conclusion
This paper has focused on the equality of citizen participation
and the reasons that we do and do not want it. On balance,
although  the  reasons  to  fear  political  equality  are  not  to  be
ignored, they are more than counterbalanced by the problems
associated  with  inequality  among  citizens  in  their  political
voice. Political equality is an important ideal. While it is true
that we will not achieve it soon, this is no reason not to contin-
ue trying.
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Notes 
1 Boswell and Tocqueville quotations, epigraphs from Verba
and Orren 1985; Paris wall graffiti, epigraph from Verba
and Nie 1972.
2 An earlier version of this article was read as the Johan
Skytte Prize Lecture at the University of Uppsala, 
Sweden, in September 2002. I am grateful to the Johan
Skytte Foundation and to Professor Leif Lewin for the
opportunity to deliver the lecture.
This article draws on a long series of empirical works
about political equality. Many of these studies have
been conducted by me along with a number of collabo-
rators. I have had the good fortune to have worked
with, and to continue working with, some of the finest
scholars in the discipline. This article is a product of
that very fruitful collaboration. I refer to Gabriel Al-
mond, with whom I started studying citizen engage-
ment more than 40 years ago (and whose recent death
has taken from us one of America’s great social scien-
tists); to Norman Nie, Jae-on Kim, John Petrocik, and
Gary Orren, with whom I continued the work 20 to
30 years ago; and Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry
Brady, and Nancy Burns, with whom I have been pur-
suing the subject for the last two decades or so. The
“I” absolves them of responsibility for judgments they
may not share, since we did not go through the usual
process of battling each sentence together, but not the
credit for a large body of research on which the ideas
in this article are based. The key relevant works are Al-
mond and Verba 1963; Verba and Nie 1972; Nie et al.
1976; Verba et al. 1979; Schlozman and Verba 1979;
Verba and Orren 1985; Verba et al. 1987; Verba et al.
1995; and Burns et al. 2001.
3 Note that equal consideration of needs and preferences
does not and cannot mean equal treatment. Citizen needs
and preferences are many and varied, and they often 
conflict. Public policies cannot satisfy all equally. Equal
consideration just means that citizen voices are equally ex-
pressed and given an equal hearing, even if some receive a
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more beneficial response. Similarly, one person/one vote
means that each citizen’s vote is counted the same—even
if some win and others lose.
4 Rae et al. 1981.
5 For a recent thorough summary of the literature on polit-
ical participation, see Schlozman 2002.
6 For a discussion of the difference in how empirical re-
searchers and political philosophers approach public opin-
ion and political behavior, see Verba 2000.
7 The level of participation and the equality of participa-
tion are closely related. If everyone participated (voting
turnout was 100 percent), there would be full equality
across all relevant social groups. However, at the lower
level of participation that is the case for voting turnout
and even more so for other acts, gross inequality fre-
quently occurs in the United States. From the perspec-
tive of representation through equal participation across
politically relevant groups, a random sample survey—
even though only a very small number of the public
(compared with the eligible electorate) would partici-
pate—might provide adequate representation. But a sur-
vey would give few a sense of membership, and it
would not foster legitimacy. See Verba et al. 1995;
Brehm 1993.
8 Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995; Schlozman 2002.
9 This point needs qualification, however. Formal rights
may exist but be violated in practice. Consider, for in-
stance, the 2000 election in Florida, where there appears
to have been differential opportunity to vote, depending
on where one lived—with serious consequences for racial
equality in opportunity to vote.
10 There are, of course, restrictions on campaign contribu-
tions by citizens, but these are not unequal across citi-
zens—at least in terms of what is allowed if not in terms
of what citizens can actually afford.
11 In 1998, 3.9 million people, or 2 percent of the popula-
tion, had lost their right to vote because of felony voting
disqualification statutes. Of all disenfranchised felons,
black males constitute about 36 percent. In other words,
1.4 million black men, or 14 percent of all black males,
cannot vote. Black men in the South are disenfranchised
at even more disparate rates. In Alabama and Florida, 31
percent of black men are permanently barred from voting;
in Virginia, Mississippi, New Mexico, Washington, and
Tennessee, this number is one in four; and in Texas and
Delaware, one in five. Weaver 2002.
12 Whether the restrictions on felons have a racial motiva-
tion is unclear. The fact that the states with the most
restrictive rules in relation to voting by ex-felons in-
clude Alabama, Mississippi, Virginia, Florida, and 
Tennessee suggests that racial considerations may be 
important. On the other hand, Washington is on the
list as well.
13 However, as the 2000 election in Florida demonstrated,
despite well-established voting rights, casting a ballot was
made more difficult for disadvantaged African Americans
because of variations in voting technology and in the ap-
plication of registration and voting regulations. 
14 Sen 1999.
15 Recent work beginning to close this gap includes Hill,
Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Hill and Leighley
1992; and Bartels 2002. For an earlier attempt to link ac-
tivity to government response, see Verba and Nie 1972,
chapters 17–9.
16 See Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995 for more details.
17 Verba et al. 1995.
18 This distinction is not always clear-cut. Resources and
motivation are not necessarily independent of each other;
an individual who lacks the former may therefore have
less of the latter.
19 Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1999.
20 Direct democracy—whether writ large as referenda or writ
small as participatory democracy in local government—
does exist with mixed success, but it is always within the
framework of a representative system.
21 Dahl 1989; Rawls 1972.
22 In addition, citizens ought to have autonomous prefer-
ences, not preferences that are created by elite manipula-
tion or “spin.” See Zaller 1992; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000.
23 Rawls 1993.
24 Lippmann 1925; Schumpeter 1942.
25 The amount contributed is for the 1988 election year. 
26 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Nie, Junn, and
Stehlig-Berry 1996. See also Stouffer 1955 and Sullivan et
al. 1982. I don’t want to overstate this case. There is the
possibility that we give educated citizens more benefit of
the doubt than they deserve when it comes to civic
virtue. This may be because they speak our language.
Some early research on the civic-mindedness of citizens
found that better-educated citizens were more likely to
have a long time horizon and to think of the public good
when contemplating social and economic issues. Less-
educated citizens and newer immigrants had a shorter
time horizon and thought of policies from the point of
view of immediate impact on themselves (see Wilson and
Banfield 1964). I think there is some truth to this, but
many years of looking at what respondents say about
public issues have also made clear that those who are
more articulate have little difficulty expressing self-interest
in broad social terms. In our research on unemployment,
Schlozman and I found that less-educated people need a
job and ask for a job. More-educated respondents need a
job and discuss the problem of unemployment—while
also asking for a job. See Schlozman and Verba 1979.
When sending research proposals to the National Science
Foundation, neither my colleagues nor I have ever argued
that the research funding would allow us to do what we
like better to do (research) rather than what we might
otherwise have to do (teach), or that the funding would
increase the prestige of our research institute. But it just
may be that some of us have such things in mind—as
well as having a sincere commitment to the substance of
678 December 2003 Vol. 1/No. 4the research and its value to scholarship and the under-
standing of society.
27 Schumpeter 1942.
28 Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980.
29 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995. See also DeNardo
1980 and Shaffer 1982.
30 Bennett and Resnick 1990. 
31 Teixeira 1992. Petrocik 1987, however, finds that it might
have made a difference in 1980 and 1984. See also Hill
and Leighley 1992. 
32 See, for instance, Piven and Cloward 1988.
33 Verba et al. 1990.
34 The data are based on two standard seven-point-scale
questions: one on government provision of jobs and the
other on cutting social spending.
35 Respondents were asked a series of questions about finan-
cial strain they had faced in the previous year—inadequate
funds for food, health care, housing, or recreation—and
whether they had to work extra hours to make ends meet.
The data are for those who reported no financial pinch
across the various questions.
36 Aid for Families with Dependent Children, food stamps,
or rent subsidies.
37 Sen 1999.
38 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Burns, Schlozman,
and Verba 2001. 
39 The dependent variable is a scale based on several more
or less standard questions about preferences for govern-
ment policies to aid the unemployed or others needing
social services.
40 In the Citizen Participation Study, respondents were
asked about the issues that may have motivated their ac-
tivity. A quite strikingly high proportion (56 percent of
campaign workers, 87 percent of contactors and commu-
nity activists, and 95 percent of protesters) said that
there was such an issue and named it. For further de-
tails and a description of the questions asked, see Verba
et al. 1995.
41 Tilly 1998.
42 Verba, Schlozman, and Burns 2003.
43 Verba, Nie, and Kim 1979.
44 Rosenstone and Hansen 1993.
45 This does not mean that the political preferences of affluent
Republican and Democratic contributors are the same. The
latter are more liberal than the former. But the stratification
pattern in terms of actual economic position is clear.
46 Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1999. 
47 For an argument in favor of it, see Lijphart 1997.
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